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ABSTRACT: Remarkably, the interaction between common law and statute has not attracted the 
scholarly attention it deserves, given that it is such a basic component of legal reasoning in 
common law systems. This is especially true in the law of employment, where the interaction 
between common law and statute is a pervasive feature of modern employment law. In recent 
years, scholars have started to rise to the challenge of developing principles to regulate this 
interaction, and this article provides a contribution to those debates. It builds upon Lord 
Hoffmann’s controversial judgment in Johnson v Unisys to identify three modes of interaction: 
statute as pre-emptive of common law development; statute as an analogical stimulus of common 
law development; and common law fundamental rights. By connecting this analysis to background 
principles of legislative supremacy and fundamental rights, it argues that Johnson v Unisys 
provides an attractive constitutional vision of the relationship between Parliament and the courts. 
 
*I am grateful to Elias LJ for chairing the lecture in such a generous spirit. I am also grateful to 
the organizers of the Current Legal Problems lecture series for the invitation, and to the editors 
and anonymous reviewers for helpful criticisms. It was a great honour to be invited. I am also 
grateful to Hugh Collins, Anne Davies, Keith Ewing, Mark Freedland, and Jeremias Prassl, for 
discussing the themes in this lecture, and for ongoing friendship, collaboration and support. I am 






How should the courts develop the common law governing the employment relationship in the 
‘Age of Statutes’?1 This is a pressing question for employment lawyers, not least because our 
world has been so heavily dominated by legislation since the late 1960s and the emergence of the 
‘floor of rights’.2 It is customary to begin such a venture by signalling that the interaction between 
common law and statute has been under-explored. Given that this interface is such a basic 
component of legal reasoning, that lack of attention is surprising. It is nevertheless also fair to say 
                                                        
1 See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Harvard UP 1982). 
2 On the statutory ‘floor of rights’, see Lord Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (2nd edn, Penguin 1971) 33. 
that that challenge is now being met admirably by legal scholars from across a wide range of legal 
disciplines.3 It is also being addressed by some fine contributions in employment law too.4 This 
article is offered as a modest contribution to those debates. 
 Improbably, given my impeccable credentials as a progressive employment lawyer, the 
arguments were inspired by Lord Hoffmann’s speech in Johnson v Unisys Ltd. 5  As all 
employment lawyers know, Mr Johnson lost his case. Paradoxically—perversely even—he lost his 
common law case of wrongful dismissal because of the existence of a protective statute. For many 
employment lawyers, the result was enough to discount Johnson as an unspeakable aberration. I 
subscribe to a different view, though it will no doubt be regarded as a provocative one: Lord 
Hoffmann’s speech in Johnson presents a compelling constitutional vision of the interaction 
between common law and legislation, and it is one that keeps the judges (and Parliament) in their 
proper place. In short, Mr Johnson’s loss was the Constitution’s gain. 
 Another reason for the hostility to Johnson is the tendency to overlook its dynamic 
potential. Critics have tended to regard Lord Hoffmann’s judgment as ossifying the common law, 
stymieing its capacity to develop as a body of worker-protective norms. This is especially 
troubling in the new constitutional context of employment law, where legislation is as likely to be 
used to disempower workers as emancipate them, and neo-liberal governments pose a profound 
threat to the fundamental rights of workers and trade unions. This underestimates what is on offer 
in Johnson. We need to look beyond the narrow result in Johnson to the richness of its reasoning. 
Lord Hoffmann’s judgment envisages three modes of interaction between statute and common 
law. The first mode is represented in Johnson itself, which is statutory pre-emption of common 
law development. The second mode envisages statute as a trigger for common law development, 
and a source of analogical inspiration. The third mode envisages a role for common law 
fundamental rights, which provides the occasion for a rather complex set of interactions between 
common law and statute. This creates constitutional space for the common law to develop as a 
bold and progressive body of norms in employment law, sometimes alongside legislation and 
sometimes in opposition to it. The development of principles to regulate that interaction has been 
rather stunted. Indeed, it is nothing short of remarkable that Johnson itself provided the first 
occasion where the constitutional context to this core problem of legal reasoning was given an 
extended judicial consideration. In the next section, the reasons for that atrophy are considered. 
Thereafter, each mode of interaction is then examined in turn. 
                                                        
3 For some recent examples in private law, see J Beatson, ‘The Role of Statute in the Development of Common Law 
Doctrine’ (2001) 117 LQR 247; Andrew Burrows, ‘The Relationship between Common Law and Statute in the Law of 
Obligations’ (2012) 128 LQR 232, 239; TT Arvind and Jenny Steele (eds), Tort Law and the Legislature: Common Law, 
Statute and the Dynamics of Legal Change (Hart 2013).  
4 ACL Davies, ‘The Relationship Between the Contract of Employment and Statute’ in Mark Freedland and others (eds), 
The Contract of Employment (OUP 2016). 
5 [2001] UKHL 13, [2003] 1 AC 518. 
II Common Law and Statute in the Law of Employment 
According to Loughlin, public law thought in Britain was ‘a polarized consciousness and it is in 
the styles of normativism and functionalism that we may identify the essential polarities’.6 It is 
striking how a parallel ‘polarized consciousness’ also permeated the historical development of 
employment law.7 These styles of thought represented fundamentally divergent theories of the 
common law and legislation. For common law normativists, the common law embodied the public 
reason of the political community, the community’s norms refined through incremental historical 
development in the common law courts.8 Statute represented a debased legal technique that often 
reflected the sectional interests of groups such as trade unions, especially following the widening 
of the democratic franchise.9 For functionalists, by contrast, the common law represented a highly 
regressive and anti-democratic impediment to progressive social and economic change. Enduring 
political change was to be achieved through the deployment of governmental power, in the form 
of primary legislation and the growth of the administrative state.10  
 These debates would often play out like some kind of Punch and Judy show, the common 
law normativist’s disdain for legislation matched only by the functionalist’s disdain for the 
common law. This explains the functionalist’s preoccupation with the ‘autonomy’ of labour law, 
insulating labour legislation from the institutions and doctrinal techniques of the common law.11 
The quest for principles to regulate and restrain the common law would have been regarded by the 
functionalist as futile, since principles were always liable to be subverted by the common law 
judiciary. It also explains the common law normativist’s aversion to any statutory disruption of the 
common law’s prized internal coherence. This was sometimes reflected in the judicial propensity 
to interpret the statutory immunities from tort liability in strike law restrictively as extraordinary 
privileges from the ordinary law.12 It was also manifest in the importation of restrictive contractual 
concepts into the judicial development of protective statutory employment rights.13 The resulting 
polarization was paralysing, stultifying the development of principles to regulate the interaction 
between common law and statute. 
 This stultification is now untenable. At a practical level, modern employment law is 
usually an amalgam of statute and common law. The effect of this amalgam is, as Freedland has 
argued: 
                                                        
6 Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (OUP 1992) 61. 
7 For a discussion of this feature of labour law scholarship, see Alan Bogg, ‘The Hero’s Journey: Lord Wedderburn and 
the “Political Constitution” of Labour Law’ (2015) 44 ILJ 299. 
8 For a discussion of the common law as ‘public reason’, see TRS Allan, ‘Text, Context, and Constitution: The Common 
Law as Public Reason’ in Douglas E Edlin (ed), Common Law Theory (CUP 2007). 
9 Loughlin (n 6) ch 5. 
10 ibid ch 6. For further discussion, see Lord Wedderburn, ‘Laski’s Law Behind the Law. 1906 to European Labour Law’ 
in Richard Rawlings (ed), Law, Society and Economy: Centenary Essays for the London School of Economics and 
Political Science 1985–1995 (OUP 1997). 
11 Bogg, ‘The Hero’s Journey’ (n 7) 307–309. Pleas for labour law’s ‘autonomy’ are still clamorous, and not confined to 
the English common law. See eg Gordon Anderson, ‘The Common Law and the Reconstruction of Employment 
Relationships in New Zealand’ (2016) 32 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 93. 
12 See eg Lord Diplock in Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs [1980] 1 WLR 142 (HL) 156H, where he described the immunities as 
‘intrinsically repugnant’. 
13 Steven Anderman, ‘The Interpretation of Protective Employment Statutes and Contracts of Employment’ (2000) 29 ILJ 
223. 
 
[T]o produce significant areas of fusion between the two—a phenomenon which has long 
existed, but which is now fairly central to this area of the law … We should understand 
that we are now talking about not so much the common law of employment contracts, as 
the common law based law of employment contracts.14  
 
Statutory interventions in employment law are often grafted onto specific types of contractual 
relation, such as the ‘worker’ concept or the ‘contract of employment’, or integrate contractual 
concepts into statutory formulae. This represents a kind of ‘hybridity’ in legal form.15 Whatever 
the abstract virtues of the ‘autonomy’ of labour law, the prospects for its political realization seem 
more remote than ever. We should engage in the task of developing workable legal principles in 
the world as it is, rather than the world as we would like it to be. 
 At a normative level, the conceptual maps of the functionalists and common law 
normativists are no longer fit for purpose. In particular, legislation is increasingly used as an 
instrument to deregulate employment protection or even threaten the worker-citizen’s fundamental 
rights. Historically, of course, employment legislation was traditionally the bulwark against an 
oppressive common law, and it provided a source of emancipation for workers. Should the 
common law simply stand aside if legislation is put to oppressive ends? In public law, for 
example, judges have developed the common law as a source of protection where legislation cuts 
against the citizen’s fundamental rights.16 It would seem perverse not to explore the emancipatory 
potential of the common law in employment law too. Functionalism and common law 
normativism are ill-suited to assisting in the search for legal principle in the new era of common 
law fundamental rights. The historical picture in employment law of the legislator as hero and 
judge as villain is now far too simplistic. Common law and statute interact in a multiplicity of 
ways, the constitutional considerations are increasingly complex in character, and the strategic 
calculations of workers and trade unions in using the law more finely balanced. There is an urgent 
need for judges and scholars to develop principles to ensure that these interactions occur in a 
coherent and rational manner. 
 In my view, Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in Johnson represents the most significant 
judicial engagement with this task to date. His judgment identifies three modes of interaction 
between legislation and the common law: statute as pre-emptive of common law development, 
statute as analogical stimulus to common law development, and common law as an independent 
source of protection for fundamental rights. Whether statute pre-empts or prompts common law 
                                                        
14 Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (OUP 2003) 4.  
15 See the perceptive comments of Sedley LJ and his use of the ‘hybridity’ description in Bournemouth University Higher 
Education Corp v Buckland [2010] EWCA Civ 121, [2011] QB 323 [19]. 
16 See eg Lord Hoffmann’s articulation of the legality principle in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p 
Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 (HL) 131, to the effect that ‘Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous 
words … In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that 
even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual’. 
development will depend upon the nature of the statute, the specific area being regulated, and the 
background principles of democracy, legality, and fundamental rights.  
 The remainder of the article will examine each mode. The first mode, which is the most 
highly developed, is statutory pre-emption. This has been of particular significance in the 
interaction between statutory unfair dismissal and common law wrongful dismissal. Indeed, this 
was the specific focus in the Johnson litigation. The article provides a cautious defence of 
statutory pre-emption of common law development of wrongful dismissal, on the basis of a theory 
of judicial incrementalism. Statutory pre-emption is also relevant to the statutory exclusion of tort 
liability for strike organizers. In contrast to wrongful dismissal, statutory pre-emption has not 
played a significant role in the sphere of economic tort liability. This is an area of the common law 
that would benefit from an extension of the Johnson pre-emption principles.  
 In the second mode, statute operates as a stimulus to common law development. The 
article examines two examples of this: the development of the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence; and the development of a ‘purposive’ approach to identifying employees and workers 
for the purposes of statutory employment protection. In this context, the integration of statute and 
common law has been shallow rather than deep. Its shallowness is reflected in the fact that whilst 
statute triggers and sets in train a process of common law development, the policies embodied in 
relevant legislation have not tended to influence the subsequent trajectory of common law 
development to a great degree. In the final section of the article, the potential role of common law 
fundamental rights is examined, and I suggest some ways in which judicial engagement with 
common law fundamental rights would promote a deeper integration of statute and common law. 
 Before proceeding, four general themes can be identified: the limits of textual 
argumentation; the role of interpretive disagreement about core constitutional concepts; the nature 
and degree of integration between statute and common law in legal interpretation; and the primacy 
of legislation. Starting with the first theme, textual or linguistic arguments about the canonical 
meaning of statutes are of limited use in providing guidance as to how the common law should be 
developed.17 Sometimes, the statutory language may provide a useful starting-point. For example, 
the fact that the compensatory award in unfair dismissal is subject to a statutory cap might suggest 
that statutory pre-emption is the most appropriate mode of interaction. Or the fact that legislation 
in an area of activity is comprehensive and detailed might also support statutory pre-emption of 
common law development.18 Ultimately, however, textual arguments only provide starting points 
for analysis. Analysis must go deeper, using normative arguments about the appropriate allocation 
of decision-making between different branches of government. This will be informed by 
background constitutional values and empirical sensitivity to the strengths and weaknesses of 
common law adjudication as a form of decision-making. 
                                                        
17 Maria Lee, ‘Occupying the Field: Tort and the Pre-emptive Statute’ in TT Arvind and Jenny Steele (eds), Tort Law and 
the Legislature: Common Law, Statute and the Dynamics of Legal Change (Hart 2013) 389. 
18 J Beatson, ‘The Role of Statute in the Development of Common Law Doctrine’ (2001) 117 LQR 247, 258. 
 The second theme emphasizes that disagreements about the interaction between statute 
and common law should be understood as interpretive disagreements.19 In determining whether a 
statute should pre-empt or stimulate a common law development, judges must reckon with 
constitutional controversies about legislative supremacy and parliamentary sovereignty, the 
separation of powers, and the rule of law. These normative concepts are complex and contested, 
and often attract animated normative disagreement. We must be normatively committed in order 
to defend one interpretation over another. The interpretive engagements with fundamental 
constitutional concepts are inescapable in reasoning about the interaction between common law 
and statute, always latent even if obscured by the economy of judicial language or blithe 
assertions of judicial common-sense.  
 The third theme invites an acknowledgement of the pervasive role of the common law, 
which informs the interpretation of statutory provisions as a prelude to determining the effects of 
legislation on developing common law doctrines. As TRS Allan has argued: 
 
The meaning of a statutory provision is as much a function of the context in which its 
language appears as the dictionary meaning or meanings of its component words and 
phrases. And the context includes the broader constitutional backcloth against which any 
amendments to the current law must be viewed and understood.20  
 
On this approach, we should not regard the common law as like a fluid that occupies interstitial 
gaps left open by statutes whose meanings are pre-interpretively plain and clear. The common 
law, with its embedded notions of legality, democracy and fundamental rights, shapes the entire 
process of legal reasoning. It informs the interpretation of the legislative text, the construction of 
its legislative purposes, and its subsequent modes of interaction with the specific common law 
doctrines. In this way, there is a deeper form of integration of statute and common law, so that ‘the 
law is constructed, by painstaking argument, from the building blocks provided by both statute 
and precedent, interpreted in a mutually supportive way’.21 
 The fourth theme is the ‘primacy of statute’.22 In part, this reflects a core constitutional 
doctrine of legislative supremacy, and the importance of judicial fidelity to enacted legislation 
reflecting the democratic will in a parliamentary democracy.23 Primacy of statute is also warranted 
by the nature of certain decisions as polycentric in nature. Polycentricity describes a situation 
where there is ‘a large network of interlocking relationships, such that a change to any one 
relationship causes a series of complex changes to other factors’.24 As an example of a polycentric 
                                                        
19 In this respect, I am indebted to TRS Allan’s account of interpretive public law. See TRS Allan, The Sovereignty of 
Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (OUP 2013) 9. 
20 ibid 173. 
21 ibid 171. 
22 ACL Davies (n 4) 81. 
23 TRS Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (OUP 1993) 81. 
24 Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (CUP 2012) 190. 
problem, Lon Fuller offers the example of wages and price setting.25 An adjudicative institution 
such as a court could not feasibly or sensibly undertake this task, because ‘the forms of 
adjudication cannot encompass and take into account the complex repercussions that may result 
from any change in prices or wages’.26 Even the sturdiest of employment lawyers would surely 
balk at the prospect of a judicially imposed minimum wage in the absence of a statutory 
intervention to that effect. While polycentric problems are pervasive across private law,27 they are 
especially prevalent in the field of employment law. To the extent that private lawyers fail to take 
polycentricity seriously, and accord a default priority to common law decision-making in general 
private law, such accounts are certainly vulnerable to criticism. A failure to take polycentricity 
sufficiently seriously is a more significant vice in employment law, however. There is a strong 
imperative in favour of judicial restraint where the law encounters a polycentric problem, and this 
provides the most cogent explanation of the deference to legislation in Johnson itself.  
 It is also important to acknowledge the ‘political’ character of employment law. 28 
Employment law is riven by deep and enduring disputes about the distribution of economic power 
in the political community. There is a corresponding political virtue in channelling those 
disagreements into political modes of adjustment, with the outcomes of political negotiation 
embodied in legislation. The mediation and adjustment of competing interests through political 
compromise offers a safety valve that facilitates social compromise in a pluralistic community 
marked by material conflicts.29 The judicial disruption of those political compromises through the 
common law risks bringing the judiciary and the common law into disrepute. This explains the 
pattern of employment law as a legal discipline based predominantly on statute.30 Employment 
law is not ‘political’ in virtue of the significant presence of legislation in the field; rather the 
predominance of legislative enactment in employment law is a reflection of the sharp ‘political’ 
conflicts that make up the daily lives of its principal protagonists, workers and employers.31 For 
these reasons, whilst there are general constitutional reasons in favour of the ‘primacy of statute’, 
there are also extra reasons specific to the particularities of employment law. Nevertheless, the 
invocation of the ‘primacy of statute’ is little more than a starting point in hard cases. Statutes can 
be accorded primacy whilst impeding, excluding or propelling common law developments. The 
key enquiry is to ascertain what the ‘primacy of statute’ might require in a specific context. 
                                                        
25 Lon L Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978–1979) 92 Harvard LR 353, 394. 
26 ibid. 
27 Lord Sumption, ‘The Limits of Law’ in NW Barber, Richard Ekins and Paul Yowell (eds), Lord Sumption and the 
Limits of the Law (Hart 2016). In the same volume, Craig argues persuasively that polycentricity is a feature of private 
law as much as public law adjudication: see Paul Craig, ‘Limits of Law: Reflections from Private and Public Law’ ibid. 
See also Anthony Mason, ‘A Judicial Perspective on the Development of Common Law Doctrine in the Light of Statute 
Law’ in Andrew Robertson and Michael Tilbury (eds), The Common Law of Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Hart 
2016) 134, who argues that there is a need for judicial restraint where the court is not institutionally equipped to 
undertake the enquiries necessary for a rational development of the law.  
28 Lord Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (3rd edn, Penguin 1986) 835. 
29 Sumption (n 27) 24.  
30 This is reflected in the views of Paul Davies and Mark Freedland that modern employment law has been shaped 
predominantly by legislation and governmental activity: see Paul Davies and Mark Freedland, Labour Legislation and 
Public Policy: A Contemporary History (OUP 1993).  
31 I am grateful to Elias LJ for pressing me on this point in a stimulating discussion following the lecture. 
III Statutory Pre-emption of Common Law Development 
Statutory Pre-emption of the Common Law and Dismissal 
It is appropriate to begin with Johnson v Unisys. Mr Johnson was employed in a senior position in 
a computer software company. He was summarily dismissed and given a month’s wages in lieu of 
notice. He lodged an internal appeal that was unsuccessful. He then made a successful claim for 
unfair dismissal, a statutory claim now contained in Part X of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
(ERA 1996), receiving the maximum compensation of £11,691.88 available at that time under the 
legislation. Following his dismissal, Mr Johnson suffered a major psychiatric illness involving a 
period of hospitalization. During his period of recovery, Mr Johnson was unable to find alternative 
employment. It seemed very likely that his difficulties in finding another job were associated with 
having suffered from the psychiatric illness that had been triggered by the manner of his dismissal.  
 Mr Johnson then instituted proceedings in the County Court for breach of contract and 
negligence under the common law in order to circumvent the limits on the compensatory award 
under the statutory unfair dismissal framework. His principal claim was an alleged breach of the 
implied term of mutual trust and confidence. He further alleged that the manner of his dismissal 
caused his mental breakdown and his subsequent inability to work, leading to a loss of earnings in 
excess of £400,000. The employer’s application to strike out this claim was successful in the 
County Court and on appeal to the Court of Appeal,32 and in a unanimous House of Lords. While 
the House of Lords decision rested upon a variety of legal bases, Johnson is most widely known 
for Lord Hoffmann’s ‘parliamentary intention’ argument. According to Lord Hoffmann:  
 
For the judiciary to construct a general common law remedy for unfair circumstances 
attending dismissal would be to go contrary to the evident intention of Parliament that 
there should be such a remedy but that it should be limited in application and extent.33  
 
Mr Johnson had already been successful in his unfair dismissal claim, and he had been awarded 
what was due to him under its scheme of limited remedies. 
 There are certainly some difficulties with the reasoning in Johnson. Lord Hoffmann’s 
reference to ‘parliamentary intention’ is opaque and distracting. As Maria Lee has argued within 
the context of a similar set of regulatory problems in environmental law, ‘the difficulty of 
extracting Parliamentary intention from the language of statute is well recognised’.34 Nor does it 
seem constitutionally appropriate for ‘parliamentary intention’ to inform the identification of the 
common law.35 In short, it is a piece of legal fiction to suggest that the answer to the very difficult 
                                                        
32 [1999] 1 All ER 854 (CA). 
33 Johnson (n 5) [58]. 
34 Lee (n 17).  
35 See PS Atiyah, ‘Common Law and Statute Law’ (1985) 48 MLR 1, 19: ‘I think a lawyer today would say that the 
common law is by definition what the judges say it is; Parliament may command the judges to change the rules they 
apply … but Parliament cannot make the common law different from what the judges say it is any more than it can alter a 
historical fact.’ 
question of how to develop the common law of wrongful dismissal is hidden away somewhere in 
Part X of the ERA 1996 awaiting judicial divination.  
 Charitably, ‘parliamentary intention’ may be shorthand for three good constitutional 
arguments that do need to be taken seriously: first, the democratic argument in favour of ‘primacy 
of statute’; secondly, the high degree of polycentricity involved in developing the common law to 
construct a general remedy for dismissals; finally, the wider allocative impact of a decision in Mr 
Johnson’s favour. Let us call these the argument from legislative finality; the argument from 
polycentricity; and the argument from allocative impact.36 Each of these considerations justify 
treating the statute as pre-emptive of a general common law remedy. Before presenting those 
constitutional arguments, however, there is a need to dispense with a red herring that has 
sometimes confused the critical analysis of Johnson. 
 First, the red herring. Critics of Johnson are sometimes keen to point to examples of other 
legislation that has not pre-empted common law development. A favourite example is the parallel 
development of common law liability for workplace injuries, alongside a highly developed 
statutory regime of workmen’s compensation.37 If the statute operated as a ‘floor’ here, then why 
not in Johnson too? We should be wary of relying too heavily on remote statutory analogies. As 
Lee has observed in the context of tort and statute, the issues are ‘too rich to be captured by a 
single command across the board: “pre-empt”, or don’t “pre-empt”’.38 The history of workmen’s 
compensation legislation indicates that the analogy is not a helpful one. In Bartrip’s history of this 
area of the law, he identifies the parallel co-existence of statutory and common law remedies as an 
enduring feature of workmen’s compensation.39 Thus, the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897 
specifically stated that the legislation did not affect any civil liability of the employer at common 
law.40 This retention of common law negligence liability was justified by Joseph Chamberlain as a 
response to the danger of workmen being under-compensated by the statutory remedy in serious 
cases of employer negligence.41 In practice the common law remedy was marginal for workers’ 
compensation claims during the 1920s and 1930s. As Deakin has explained, the ‘cap’ on 
compensation in the Workmen’s Compensation Acts was generally sufficient to provide adequate 
compensation for most employees, and there were procedural advantages in employees pursuing 
compensation under the legislation, the effect of which was to bar a claim in tort.42  
                                                        
36 As will be clear from what follows, this framework is indebted to Jeff King’s articulation of a theory of adjudication in 
Judging Social Rights: King, Judging Social Rights (n 24). 
37 See Alan Bogg and Hugh Collins, ‘Lord Hoffmann and the Law of Employment: The Notorious Episode of Johnson v 
Unisys Ltd’ in Paul S Davies and Justine Pila (eds), The Jurisprudence of Lord Hoffmann: A Festschrift in Honour of 
Lord Leonard Hoffmann (Hart 2015) 193. 
38 Lee (n 17) 383. 
39 PWJ Bartrip, Workmen’s Compensation in Twentieth Century Britain: Law, History and Social Policy (Gower 1987). 
40 ibid 219. 
41 ibid 219–220. 
42 Simon Deakin, ‘Tort Law and Workmen’s Compensation Legislation: Complementary or Competing Models?’ in TT 
Arvind and Jenny Steele (eds), Tort Law and the Legislature: Common Law, Statute and the Dynamics of Legal Change 
(Hart 2013) 259–260. 
 For a variety of reasons the practical significance of the common law began to grow again 
during the 1940s.43 It was no surprise, therefore, that William Beveridge recommended the setting 
up of a committee to consider the issue of alternative remedies in 1944, chaired by Sir Walter 
Monckton. 44  Reporting in 1946, this recommended the retention of common law liability 
alongside the social insurance regime. When the Workmen’s Compensation legislation was 
repealed in 1948, the common law of tort became central to employer liability for workplace 
injuries. This acceleration occurred after the repeal of the legislation; hence the legislation could 
not be described as constituting any kind of ‘floor’ for common law development. The context 
makes clear that the Workmen’s Compensation Acts were never conceived as ‘pre-emptive’ 
statutes. 
 Having disposed of the red herring, we can now return to more relevant concerns. 
Starting with the argument from legislative finality, there are strong general arguments requiring 
the fidelity of judges to primary legislation enacted by democratic legislatures. 45  Within the 
context of unfair dismissal legislation, the statute embodies a comprehensive scheme of regulation 
of dismissal with carefully crafted limitations on the scope of the right, its available remedies, and 
the creation of special adjudicative mechanisms for considering complaints of unfair dismissal. 
Furthermore, this is not a legislative settlement that was finalized and forgotten by the legislature. 
On the contrary, its limits and restrictions have been revised at regular intervals across its 40-odd-
year life-span. In these circumstances, the judicial obligation of fidelity and obedience to 
democratically enacted legislation has significant weight.46 
 In his important work on the adjudication of social rights, King has rightly observed that 
the democratic argument supporting what he describes as ‘finality of legislation’ is subject to 
limits.47 Specifically, it might be possible to modify the default of strong judicial deference to 
primary legislation where there has been an absence of deliberative legislative focus on the 
relevant rights issues in the enactment of the legislation.48 The modification of strong judicial 
deference might also be warranted where the legislative process has failed to consider the interests 
of groups that are ‘particularly vulnerable to majoritarian bias or neglect’.49 To what extent are 
groups excluded from unfair dismissal protection ‘particularly vulnerable to majoritarian bias or 
neglect’? This formula would encompass groups such as ‘the disabled, the elderly, the homeless, 
(some) social assistance recipients, certain isolated religious minorities, single parents, those with 
uncommon diseases or disabilities, those with mental health problems, and so on’.50 It could be 
argued that there are certain groups of especially vulnerable workers whose interests have been 
                                                        
43 Bartrip (n 39) 223. 
44 ibid 224–228. 
45 The leading work is still Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 1999). 
46 This argument is correspondingly weakened where changes to the qualification periods and other aspects of the legal 
framework were introduced through secondary legislation that bypassed parliamentary debate. I am grateful to Jeremias 
Prassl for asserting this point. 
47 King, Judging Social Rights (n 24) 163–169. 
48 ibid 164–165. 
49 ibid 165–169. 
50 ibid 182. 
systematically disregarded in the design of the statutory regime. For example those on ‘atypical’ 
or ‘zero hours’ contracts who fail to meet the two year continuity threshold are badly affected. 
Also, workers who are in highly precarious or even ‘sham’ self-employment arrangements and 
hence struggle to satisfy the requirement of a ‘contract of employment’ are vulnerable too. These 
economically vulnerable groups of workers are likely to lack political efficacy in the democratic 
process, given that economic, social and political exclusion tends to be mutually reinforcing. 
These considerations are not fanciful, and they attenuate the strength of the argument from 
legislative finality. 
 Against those concerns, we must also weigh in the problem of ‘giving the middle classes 
and the wealthy powers to obtain benefits from the constitutional jurisdiction of courts, over and 
above the unequal influence they already enjoy in the legislature’. 51  Like many litigants in 
employment law in recent times, Mr Johnson was a high-status employee with considerable 
earning capacity. As Lord Steyn observed in Johnson:  
 
The statutory system was therefore always only capable of meeting the requirements of 
cases at the lower end of seriousness. Manifestly, it was always incapable, for example, 
of affording any significant financial compensation to employees with substantial salaries 
and pension entitlements in cases where they suffered a serious loss of employment 
prospects due to the manner of their dismissal. In such cases, inter alia, the artificial 
statutory limits from the inception inhibited significant compensation.52  
 
In my view, this provides an argument against developing the common law to permit a remedy, 
not an argument in favour of a parallel common law remedy. Otherwise, wealthy high-status 
employees might deploy their superior resources in litigation to benefit from a common law 
circumvention of the remedial limits in the statutory jurisdiction. This might be at the expense of 
lower skilled employees in the shape of redundancies, or overall reductions of wages and other 
financial benefits, or fewer employment opportunities for the unemployed. It undermines norms of 
democratic equality where courts compound the advantages of wealthy middle class employees 
who may already be privileged in the wider democratic process. 
 Consequently, there are strong democratic arguments in favour of treating the unfair 
dismissal legislation as pre-emptive of common law development in Johnson, although those 
arguments are by no means conclusive. This judicial restraint is also supported by the argument 
from polycentricity. King’s work on polycentricity has provided a sophisticated account of its 
nature and significance in social rights adjudication. Building upon Fuller’s seminal work, King 
has argued that polycentricity contemplates a situation ‘when the court is asked to make or should 
make a finding about the substantial and heterogeneous interests of a large number of non-
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represented persons’.53 Furthermore, these non-represented interests are a ‘primary consideration’ 
in situations where the court is being invited to overrule established common law precedents or 
qualify common law rules.54 In my view, the dispute in Johnson was a paradigm case of what 
King would characterize as a primary polycentric dispute. Mr Johnson was arguing for a 
significant extension of the implied term of trust and confidence, disrupting long-standing 
common law precedent on wrongful dismissal.55 It involved a legal claim for recovery for the 
economic losses attributable to psychiatric injury caused by the breach of contract, an area of the 
common law that has been replete with policy anxieties about the scope of recovery for ‘nervous 
shock’. Although Lord Hoffmann did not use the language of polycentricity, it would seem that 
the substance of those concerns gave Lord Hoffmann significant pause for thought in Johnson. It 
was entirely appropriate that they should do so. 
 One of the advances marked in King’s analysis of polycentricity is his rejection of the 
idea that its presence marks a zone of non-justiciability. Since polycentricity is ‘pervasive’,56 in 
both public and private law,57 a non-justiciability approach would be inappropriate. Rather, it is 
necessary to identify ways in which polycentricity might be either ‘attenuated’ or magnified as a 
legitimate consideration in social rights adjudication.58 In my view, the presence of attenuating 
factors in Johnson is limited. First, the House of Lords was being invited to hold that mutual trust 
and confidence, a term implied in law in all contracts of employment, augmented the rights and 
remedies of employees in wrongful dismissal claims. Consequently, this was not a case where the 
claim could have been decided on narrow grounds. Rather, it created a serious risk of establishing 
‘a broadly applicable precedent uncontrollable through sound case management’.59 The wider 
distributive consequences of such a broad holding on employment practices were unknown and, to 
a court at least, unknowable. To decide in Mr Johnson’s favour in these circumstances would have 
been a momentous step,60 and an irresponsible shot in the dark.  
 Secondly, this was not a public law dispute but a dispute between private parties. 
Consequently, the state was not represented in the legal proceedings as it might have been in 
judicial review proceedings, and hence the wider ‘public interest’ could not be vindicated in 
bipolar litigation between private parties. Whilst it is possible for the court to give permission to 
third party intervenors in appeals,61 there was no such intervention in Johnson. Furthermore, even 
if the court had given permission for third party intervention, it is unlikely that the House of Lords 
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would have been competent to evaluate complex social science data on the possible labour market 
consequences of the reversal of Addis in wrongful dismissal claims.  
 Ultimately, of course, there is no ‘correct’ moral or economic answer to the adjustment of 
trade-offs between employers, ‘high-status’ employees, ‘low-status’ employees, employees on 
short-term contracts, self-employed workers, the unemployed, and so forth. The adjustments are 
messy, ad hoc, and often contingent on the balance of social forces between different groups of 
workers. In other words, the adjustments are political. This may count in favour of the technique 
of legislative compromise, such as is reflected in the statutory cap on the compensatory award.62 
Such legislative compromises can also be readjusted through legislative change. Deference to the 
political process would of course be subject to the ongoing need for courts to be astute to the 
potential marginalization of groups that are vulnerable to systematic majoritarian bias in the 
democratic process. ‘Casual’ workers are the likeliest group to form such a category under current 
labour market conditions. 
 Finally, the argument from allocative impact lends further support to Lord Hoffmann’s 
constitutional reservations in Johnson. King has defined allocative impact as ‘the financial or 
distributional adjustment made necessary by a court’s judgment’. 63  In Johnson, the potential 
allocative impact of the decision was significant. Building upon King’s representative list of 
allocative impact factors generated by legal judgments,64 the following distributional adjustments 
may have occurred if Johnson had been decided in the claimant’s favour: (i) judgment damages of 
over £400,000 and the associated costs of compliance with the court’s order; (ii) legal 
representation costs; (iii) costs of legal and Human Resources compliance for public and private 
sector employers adjusting to the new wrongful dismissal regime; (iv) insurance costs reflecting 
the increased potential financial liabilities of employers in dismissal claims; (v) defensive hiring 
policies, particularly in relation to the hiring of employees with a history of mental illness; (vi) 
reduced willingness of employers to hire new employees on permanent contracts of employment, 
reducing public revenue from taxation and increasing burdens on welfare state provision; (vii) 
further appellate litigation to clarify the limits of the judgment, whether it applied to stigma 
damages in wrongful dismissal claims, whether trust and confidence could be waived through an 
express contractual term, and so forth. Where the interpretation of a statute or the following of an 
applicable precedent is clear, such allocative impact considerations should be irrelevant to the 
court’s task. In cases such as Johnson, where the court is being invited to take a significant 
interpretive step, it would be irresponsible for the court not to weigh the allocative impact in the 
balance of relevant considerations. In Johnson, the allocative impact costs were significant and 
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any judicial prediction of how they might unfold prone to significant error, given the dynamic 
complexities at play. 
 In the immediate aftermath of Johnson, the critical reaction in the academic literature was 
fierce and uncompromising. Recent engagements with Johnson have adopted a more sympathetic 
and conciliatory tone.65 The case law that has followed on from Johnson has continued to attract 
significant criticism for its doctrinal incoherence. In strictly doctrinal terms, I am sympathetic to 
those criticisms. However, if we interpret those later judgments through the lens of a theory of 
adjudication, rather than through a theory of doctrinal legal concepts, it is possible to identify a 
logic underlying the doctrinal oddities. In particular, the jurisprudence that followed Johnson can 
be understood as an exercise in judicial incrementalism, 66  cautiously extending the reach of 
common law protection in manageable steps so as to preserve flexibility in the light of the 
significant allocative impact considerations that cautioned restraint in Johnson. We shall first 
consider R (Shoesmith) v OFSTED,67 and then the highly controversial Supreme Court decision in 
Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust.68 This provides a helpful reminder 
that writing a case note is a different exercise to writing a judgment, since the latter may have a 
seismic impact on the lives of real people. 
 In Shoesmith the occupant of the statutory post of Director of Children’s Services at 
Haringey Council was removed from her post under instruction from the Secretary of State in the 
febrile aftermath of the ‘Baby P’ tragedy. In granting her public law remedies as an office-holder, 
Maurice Kay LJ had regard to the remedial and procedural inadequacies of the statutory unfair 
dismissal remedy relative to judicial review as a justification for permitting her judicial review 
claim to proceed.69 He thus inverted the reasoning in Johnson, where the limits in the statutory 
regime were used as a justification for blocking common law development. Given that this inverts 
the reasoning in Johnson, does this reveal incoherence in the common law of wrongful dismissal? 
Deploying the theory of incremental adjudication, in the light of the allocative impact concerns in 
Johnson, I think there are four distinguishing features that explain the divergence between 
Johnson and Shoesmith.  
 First, the court in Shoesmith was applying well-established common law rules and 
techniques in judicial review, rather than developing the common law in a novel and striking way. 
Secondly, the common law intervention was tailored very narrowly to ‘office-holders’ in public 
law, thereby limiting the scope of potential beneficiaries. Thirdly, the judgment was heavily 
particularized. The facts were, on any view, extreme. It involved an outrageous abuse of public 
power, in the form of a heavy-handed and populist intervention by a Secretary of State in 
circumstances that were catastrophic for Ms Shoesmith’s future employability. Added to this is 
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the particularizing tendency of judicial review proceedings to isolate ‘a specific decision or series 
of decisions and evaluating it in the context of the powers being exercised’.70 Finally, the harm in 
Shoesmith involved stigma and reputational injury rather than psychiatric injury. In this way, it 
was delinked from the wider common law anxieties about ‘floodgates’ in recovery for nervous 
shock. Freedland and Kountouris are correct in suggesting that there will be little ‘trickle down’ of 
the holding in Shoesmith to rank and file public sector workers. 71  From the perspective of 
allocative impact, and a theory of incremental adjudication, that is a virtue rather than a vice. 
 Edwards is a more controversial decision. The majority of the Supreme Court concluded 
that express contractual terms guaranteeing disciplinary procedures could not give rise to an action 
for ‘stigma’ damages but could be enforced only through an injunction. It would only be possible 
for such a contractual term to be enforced through an action for damages where there was a 
further express term in the contract to this effect. According to three of the Justices (Lord Dyson, 
Lord Wilson, and Lord Mance SCJJ), this conclusion followed from the constitutional reasoning 
in Johnson. Since most disciplinary procedures were adopted pursuant to compliance with the 
statutory unfair dismissal jurisdiction, requiring notification in the employee’s right to a written 
statement of employment particulars under section 1 of the ERA 1996, this meant that ‘Parliament 
has decided, at least in most cases, that contractual force should be given to applicable rules and 
procedures’. 72  From the perspective of doctrinal coherence, Edwards is a very problematic 
decision. In particular, even if employers have introduced workplace disciplinary procedures to 
comply with unfair dismissal law, it does not follow that such procedures are contractually 
binding. That falls to be determined on the basis of ordinary contractual principles governing the 
incorporation of terms.73 Where there is an express term in the contract, it should be enforceable 
in the ordinary way by an action for damages. 
 Nevertheless, it might be possible to explain the odd doctrinal contours of Edwards using 
the theory of incremental adjudication. According remedial primacy to the injunction avoids many 
of the allocative impact concerns in Johnson. While there will certainly be costs associated with 
the issuing of an injunction, those costs are far more predictable than would be the case for 
assessing stigma damages on a case-by-case basis. After all, the employer is simply required to 
observe the procedure that it has already agreed to in the contract. The existence of a ‘double lock’ 
requiring a further express agreement for claiming stigma damages for breach of the procedural 
term provides an extra opportunity for the allocative costs of enforcement to be adjusted through 
contractual negotiation. In effect, this is a form of deference to private negotiation as a procedural 
solution to a polycentric problem in employment law. This allows the impact of Edwards to be 
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assessed and calibrated, leaving courts further room for manoeuvre to revisit the holding once its 
wider impact is better known. 
 Finally, Edwards exemplifies what might be described as a strategy of ‘avoidance’.74 
Many legal threads are left hanging. Does Edwards apply to the breach of express terms placing 
substantive restrictions on the dismissal power? Is it confined to stigma damages or do its 
restrictions extend to damages for psychiatric injury? Is the recovery of Gunton damages (wages 
for the period of time it would have taken to conduct the process) permitted after Edwards?75 This 
leaves open the possibility for further incremental development of the law on wrongful dismissal. 
Yet it is fair to say that the high degree of legal uncertainty generated by Edwards may be 
counterproductive, as employers and employees resort to further litigation to discover what the 
decision really means.76 This generates rather than mitigates allocative impact problems. 
Common Law and Statute in the Law of Strikes 
In Wedderburn’s vivid description, strike law has often resembled a pendulum which ‘had swung 
to and fro between judicial liabilities and statutory protection’. 77  As judges developed new 
common law liabilities to impede the collective action of trade unions, especially through the 
extension of tort liability for strike organizers, Parliament intervened through legislation to 
exclude those liabilities in the guise of the ‘trade dispute’ immunity.  
 According to Simpson, this is an area where ‘legislation has been a significant influence 
on the expansion of economic tort liability in Britain’.78 During expansionist periods of common 
law development of economic tort liability, especially from the mid-1960s onwards, Simpson 
attributes this to judicial motivations to outflank the statutory immunities in order to exert control 
over the direction of policy in the sphere of strike law.79 Sometimes this judicial perception of 
policy was quite at variance with that of the democratically elected legislature, such as Lord 
Denning’s infamous hostility to the legitimacy of secondary industrial action. 80  Simpson’s 
analysis is compelling. Nevertheless, the strong influence of legislation on common law 
development of economic torts was in fact a product of a style of judicial reasoning that treated 
the common law question of tort liability as sequentially prior to and analytically distinct from the 
scope of the statutory immunity. Thus, while the legislation may have been influential, it operated 
invisibly on common law development, like a hidden mass exerting a gravitational pull on the 
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common law. In fact, this entire area is a vivid manifestation of what Beatson has described as the 
‘oil and water’ approach to common law and statute.81 
 An unlikely starting-point for this ‘oil and water’ thesis is Crofter Hand Woven Harris 
Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch, which many writers regard as the golden highpoint of judicial 
abstentionism in the sphere of strike law.82 The facts are well-known. The respondents, officials in 
the Transport and General Workers Union, acted in combination with the owners of mills on the 
island of Lewis to enforce a blockade of producers of tweed cloth who were undercutting the mill 
owners. The House of Lords concluded that the ingredients of the tort of conspiracy to injure had 
not been made out, because the predominant purpose of the combination was the legitimate 
promotion of the trade interests of those in combination; and that neither criminal nor tortious 
means had been employed to promote those interests. According to Simpson, in the Crofter case 
‘the Law Lords were aligning the common law with the legislative policy behind section 1 of the 
1906 Act … It was clear that the policy behind the common law and the legislation was at the 
least very similar if not identical’.83  
 As an account of the unarticulated motivations of the judges in Crofter, Simpson’s claim, 
though speculative, has some plausibility. Nevertheless, when one reads the judgments in Crofter, 
what seems most remarkable is the refusal to examine legislative policy in determining the 
contours of the conspiracy tort. Instead, the constituent elements of the tort are examined as an 
exercise in pure common law reasoning and through an exhaustive examination of the common 
law authorities. As such, what is remarkable about the Crofter case is the irrelevance of legislative 
policy to the determination of the common law liability in the judicial reasoning. While the 
substantive convergence between common law and legislative policy is unlikely to have been 
fortuitous, the common law judges ensured that the common law got to that destination guided by 
its own lights. Even in the most progressive of the speeches in Crofter, delivered by Lord Wright, 
his Lordship based the normative justification on the tenets of the common law itself:  
 
The common law in England might have adopted a different criterion and one more 
consistent with the standpoint of a man who refuses to benefit himself at the cost of 
harming another. But we live in a competitive or acquisitive society, and the English 
common law may have felt that it was beyond its power to fix by any but the crudest 
distinctions the metes and bounds which divide the rightful from the wrongful use of the 
actor’s own freedom … If further principles of regulation or control are to be introduced, 
that is matter for the legislature.84  
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While this displays some constitutional sensitivity to the subordinate position of the common law 
judge, it neatly sidestepped the fact that statutory principles of regulation and control had already 
been introduced by the legislature in 1906. It would have been perfectly possible for Lord Wright 
to give those statutory principles explicit force in shaping and constraining common law 
development in Crofter. Yet it is surely significant that Lord Wright preferred to base his 
reasoning within the normative compass of the common law and its model of the ‘acquisitive 
society’.  
 It is conventional to identify the rupture in judicial policy on strike action to 1964, and the 
House of Lords’ momentous decision in Rookes v Barnard.85  Certainly, Rookes marked the 
transition from an ‘abstentionist’ to an ‘interventionist’ common law in strike law. Nevertheless, 
the move from Crofter to Rookes was in fact less remarkable than has been supposed. Certainly, 
there were discontinuities on the surface. Crofter worked with the grain of legislative policy, 
whereas Rookes marked something of a constitutional revolt by the judges in developing the 
economic torts in defiance of legislative policy. However, in terms of styles of judicial reasoning, 
there were in fact strong continuities between Crofter and Rookes in the propensity of the judges 
to deal with the relevant tort issues as matters of pure common law, to be determined within the 
four corners of existing common law authority. While it is putting the point too strongly to suggest 
that Crofter sowed the seeds for Rookes, the marked failure in Crofter to integrate legislative 
policy explicitly into the common law reasoning process left the common law vulnerable to 
precisely the kind of expansionism that followed in the decades after 1964. 
 In Rookes v Barnard, trade unionists secured the lawful dismissal of a non-unionist in a 
closed shop context. Mr Rookes was suspended and then subsequently dismissed as a 
consequence of strike threats by his fellow employees. It was conceded that such threats were 
threats to breach the contract of employment. Mr Rookes successfully sued for damages for the 
tort of intimidation. The question for the House of Lords was whether there was such a tort at 
common law and, if there was, whether it was within the scope of the statutory immunity in the 
‘trade dispute’ defence.  
 The speeches in the House of Lords adopted a sequential approach to the legal analysis. 
The question whether the tort had been committed at common law was logically prior to and 
severable from the enquiry into whether the statutory immunity was applicable. Once the case 
reached the House of Lords, the principal controversy at common law was not whether the tort of 
intimidation existed, but whether it extended beyond threats to commit crimes and torts to a threat 
to break a contract. For many of their Lordships, that was treated as a matter to be determined 
within the logic of common law analysis. Thus, Lord Reid observed that: 
 
Threatening a breach of contract may be a much more coercive weapon than threatening a 
tort, particularly when the threat is directed against a company or corporation, and, if 
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there is no technical reason requiring a distinction between different kinds of threats, I 
can see no other ground for making any such distinction.86  
 
There was of course a compelling ‘technical’ reason to draw the line at threats to commit a tort, 
which was that extending the tort of intimidation in this way outflanked the statutory immunity 
and extinguished the liberty to strike.  
 Lord Evershed came closer to acknowledging the constitutional character of the common 
law determination but drew back from the force of its implications:  
 
I cannot find, in accordance with logic, reason or common sense, anything between 
threats to do tortious or criminal acts, on the one hand, and threats to break contracts … It 
is no doubt true that in attempting to extract the principle from the present case there is 
some obscurity caused by the circumstances with which we are concerned, that is, first, 
the actual nature of the alleged threats and, second, by the presence in the background of 
the Trade Disputes Act, 1906.87  
 
To avoid contaminating the common law analysis with the ‘background’ of the trade dispute 
legislation and the wider industrial relations context, his Lordship engaged in a casuistic 
consideration of problems in landlord and tenant law to fortify his conclusion that the tort of 
intimidation encompassed a threat to break a contract. 
 In retrospect, the judicial refusal to acknowledge the profound consequences of the 
holding in Rookes v Barnard for the right to strike, and the refusal to expose common law 
reasoning to the statutory context, is rather staggering. The case came as close as a labour law case 
might to precipitating a constitutional crisis between Parliament and the courts. It must therefore 
be acknowledged that Lord Devlin was brave enough to address this constitutional difficulty head 
on, in his recognition that ‘the strike weapon is now so generally sanctioned that it cannot really 
be regarded as an unlawful weapon of intimidation; and so there must be something wrong with a 
conclusion that treats it as such’.88 As he recognized, one possibility would have been to confine 
the tort of intimidation to threats to commit a tort, excluding threats to breach a contract from the 
scope of illegality, so as to preserve the evident legislative policy in favour of a protected liberty 
to strike. This had obviously attracted the Court of Appeal in reaching its conclusion that 
intimidation did not extend to threats to break a contract.  
 Ultimately, however, Lord Devlin deprecated any attempt to ‘hobble the common law’ or 
even ‘to cripple the common law’ by confining the tort artificially in the light of the statutory 
context.89 Admittedly, Lord Devlin was alive to the constitutional problem:  
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For the universal purposes of the common law, I am sure that that is the right, natural and 
logical line. For the purpose of the limited field of industrial disputes which is controlled 
by statute and where much that is in principle unlawful is already tolerated, it may be that 
pragmatically and on grounds of policy the line should be drawn between physical and 
economic pressure. But that is for Parliament to decide.90  
 
Yet Lord Devlin went on to endorse a great judicial interference in a matter of policy that was 
properly within the province of Parliament. The damaging effects of Rookes required an urgent 
legislative response extending the statutory immunity to encompass the new tort of intimidation.91 
We cannot be so sure that such a legislative response would be forthcoming if Rookes was handed 
down today. 
 Later judgments have been rather more inclined to restrain the development of the 
economic torts. The leading case is now OBG Ltd v Allan where the House of Lords took an 
uncharacteristically restrained approach to the rationalization and limits of the economic torts in 
the English common law.92 As Wedderburn has pointed out, it is perhaps not a coincidence that 
this ethos of restraint occurred within the context of a commercial rather than an industrial 
dispute.93 Approving Lord Hoffmann’s reasoning in OBG, Lady Hale invoked the constitutional 
context to labour disputes as a further justification for the limiting of liability for economic torts, 
and its consistency— 
 
… with legal policy to limit rather than to encourage the expansion of liability in this 
area. In the modern age Parliament has shown itself more than ready to legislate to draw 
the line between fair and unfair trade competition or between fair and unfair trade union 
activity. This can involve major economic and social questions which are often politically 
sensitive and require more complicated answers than the courts can devise. Such things 
are better left to Parliament.94  
 
This is an important statement of constitutional principle. Where sensitive political issues are 
involved, such as setting the limits of lawful strike action, the courts should operate as subsidiary 
constitutional actors. Such issues will display a high degree of polycentricity and will often 
involve highly charged political questions concerning the appropriate distribution of social and 
economic power. The adjudication of the merits of specific industrial disputes is also liable to 
bring the courts into disrepute, at least with the side that loses. While the neutrality of the common 
law in the employment sphere is no doubt little more than a comforting illusion at the best of 
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times, the partiality is particularly stark when judges are invited to take sides in a legal dispute 
arising out of a strike. Wedderburn, perhaps uncharitably, described Lady Hale’s constitutional 
position as ‘another brick in the wall built by the decision in Johnson v Unisys’.95 From another 
perspective, we might regard OBG and Johnson as welcome bricks in the wall to stand in the way 
of another Rookes. 
 Have we now reached a position where the trade dispute immunity can be regarded as a 
‘pre-emptive’ statute that has occupied the field of strike law, with OBG mirroring the 
constitutional restraint of Johnson? Such a conclusion would be premature, despite the advance 
marked by OBG. First, even some of the most progressive judgments in strike law have been beset 
by a tendency to continue regarding the common law and statute as ‘oil’ and ‘water’. Thus, Lord 
Scarman’s speech in Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs is in many ways a tour de force of judicial 
minimalism. 96  After drawing a contrast between ‘justice’ and ‘justice according to law’ in 
admonishing Lord Denning’s extraordinary misuse of judicial interpretive powers in the Court of 
Appeal, he observed:  
 
The common law and equity, both of them in essence systems of private law, are fields 
where, subject to the increasing intrusion of statute law, society has been content to allow 
the judges to formulate and develop the law … But in the field of statute law the judge 
must be obedient to the will of Parliament as expressed in its enactments.97  
 
Thus, statute is still an ‘intrusion’ on the common law, and in constitutional terms, common law 
and statute are still running in separate streams. While this curtails the deliberate manipulation of 
statutes through eccentric statutory interpretations to further judicial policies on strike law, in the 
style of Lord Denning at his creative worst, it contemplates no brake on creative expansion of 
economic torts at common law in deference to the legislative policy expressed in statutes such as 
the trade dispute defence. 
 The second ground for caution is prompted by the remarkably candid extra-judicial 
reflections of Lord Hoffmann on the role of the economic torts in strike disputes. In reflecting on 
Rookes, Lord Hoffmann observed that the 1960s and 1970s were beset by ‘excessive use of trade 
union power, often by small factions within the unions’ and this ‘had alienated the judges and 
eventually the public’.98 Lord Hoffmann regarded it as a particular virtue of Rookes that ‘this new 
tort had the advantage of not being protected by the 1906 Act’.99 For Lord Hoffmann, this growth 
in unchecked trade union power led to its unrestrained abuse. It was a consequence of an 
‘experiment in total laissez faire … based on the social theories of Professor Otto Kahn-Freund, a 
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refugee from the Nazis … I remember him at Oxford, a most learned, gentle and charming man 
who did more damage to the United Kingdom than any German since Hitler’.100  
 It is not the occasion to deconstruct this tin-eared presentation of labour history. There 
was never ‘total’ laissez-faire. Strike action was always subject to the limits of the statutory trade 
dispute formula. Indeed, the idea of ‘total’ laissez-faire is barely coherent given that even free 
markets have legal limits defined by the laws of contract, tort and property. Nor was it an 
‘experiment’: there was no dastardly and reckless blueprint. The structure reflected a highly 
complex evolutionary pattern formed by the interaction between social forces and the political 
system over centuries. Kahn-Freund was an interpreter of that pattern, a legal sociologist, not its 
architect. For Lord Hoffmann, the Conservative governments during the 1980s implemented the 
necessary statutory reforms to ban secondary industrial action and impose secret ballots on trade 
unions: ‘Parliament has taken over the task of delimiting what industrial action should be lawful 
or unlawful’.101 This has removed the need for expansively developed economic torts, providing 
judges with new techniques of control through the tools of statutory interpretation. Nevertheless, 
the subtext is clear. While Parliament has for now ‘taken over’ the task of control from the 
judiciary, the judiciary may be prepared to renew their acquaintance with the economic torts if 
Parliament decides to reverse its statutory restrictions. In this way, OBG may represent judicial 
‘deference’, but it is deference on the common law’s own terms rather than deference guided by 
respect for legislative supremacy. In terms of judicial personalities, Lord Hoffmann occupies an 
ambivalent position in the unfolding story of the common law’s encounter with legislation, hero in 
Johnson and villain in OBG. It is perhaps not entirely coincidental that this corresponds to the 
distinction between ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ labour law, with common law mischief arising in 
the latter domain. 
IV Statute as an Analogical Stimulus of Common Law Development 
In Johnson Lord Hoffmann referred approvingly to legislation as a source of analogical principle 
for common law development.102 There are two main contexts where this analogical development 
of common law appears to have been prompted by statute: the emergence of the implied term of 
mutual trust and confidence; and the development of a ‘purposive’ approach to the contractual 
tests for identifying ‘worker’ and ‘employee’ for the purposes of claiming statutory employment 
rights. In each case, despite the superficial importance of statute in triggering the common law 
development, the encounter between statute and common law has been shallow rather than deep. 
 The implied term of mutual trust and confidence is now an integral element of personal 
work contracts. The adjudicative context for its initial emergence was the complex body of law on 
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constructive dismissal.103 This concept extended dismissal to include termination of the contract 
by the employee ‘in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it by reason of the 
employer’s conduct’.104 This necessitated a legal formulation of an employee’s ‘entitlement to 
terminate’ the employment contract. The courts adopted a contractual test of repudiatory 
breach.105 This triggered ‘a process of formulation of implied terms, which were in effect back-
formations, in the sense that they were terms the breach of which would amount to expulsive or 
repudiatory conduct sufficient to constitute constructive dismissal by the employer’. 106  The 
elaboration of these behavioural standards of employing entities came to be rationalized through 
the implied term of mutual trust and confidence in Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew, 
which became a central tenet of the law of constructive dismissal.107  
 In this sense, then, the statute played a pivotal role in triggering the emergence of the 
implied term, through the statutory concept of constructive dismissal. It would be going too far to 
suggest that the development of trust and confidence represents: 
 
[T]he kind of ‘blind legal evolution’ which may occur as a result of the interaction of 
statute in the common law, in an area where statute draws heavily on the common law for 
its own conceptual structure. Through a series of ‘loops’, the philosophy and perspectives 
of the legislation have fed back into the common law, and vice versa.108  
 
In fact, the leading appellate decisions on the implied term have conceptualized it as a common 
law development, supported principally by internal common law reasoning. While legislation 
might have triggered the normative elaboration of the implied term, this elaboration has been 
developed principally through distinctive forms of common law reasoning rather than by analogy 
with statute. 
 The leading case on the implied term is still the House of Lords decision in Malik v 
BCCI.109 This decision confirmed the existence of the implied term. In Malik, the implied term 
would give rise to a claim for stigma damages in a situation where the employing bank had been 
operating a corrupt and dishonest operation and the employees had suffered reputational damage 
affecting their future employability as a result of the employer’s breach. The two lead judgments 
were delivered by Lord Nicholls and Lord Steyn. Both of them were exercised by the difficulty 
posed by Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd, which restricted the recoverability of stigma damages 
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consequent on dismissal. 110  This is important in understanding the specific role of statutory 
analogies in both judgments. 
 Lord Nicholls referred approvingly to the development of the implied term as a fact of 
modern employment law. It reflected the fact that ‘Employment, and job prospects, are matters of 
vital concern to most people … An employment contract creates a close personal relationship, 
where there is often a disparity of power between the parties. Frequently the employee is 
vulnerable’.111 This contributed to the shift in judicial perspective on the special nature of the 
employment contract, and the role of trust and confidence in controlling abuse of power. Yet 
strikingly none of this is attributed to the growth in influence of statutory rights. Lord Nicholls 
invoked the statutory analogy, specifically the availability of compensation for economic loss 
brought about by reputational damage caused by the manner and circumstances of a dismissal, in 
arguing against the artificial restrictions imposed by Addis on the application of ‘ordinary 
contractual principles’.112 In other words, the statutory analogy is focused on a narrow remedial 
point, and it is invoked in order to justify the restoration of ordinary contractual principles 
governing contractual damages. The statutory analogy does not inform the developing substantive 
content of the implied term.  
 Similarly, Lord Steyn explained the origins of the implied term in the common law itself: 
‘The evolution of the term is a comparatively recent development. The obligation probably has its 
origin in the general duty of co-operation between contracting parties’.113 Significantly, Lord 
Steyn referred to a ‘change in legal culture’ underpinning the implied term.114 Yet this ‘change in 
legal culture’ was a change in common law legal culture. Thus, Lord Steyn referred approvingly to 
the decisions in Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc115 and Scally v Southern Health and Social 
Services Board116 as evidence of this legal evolution. Yet both Spring and Scally were classic 
common law decisions. Spring was concerned with the negligence liability of providers of 
references, and involved an incremental extension of Hedley Byrne liability. 117  Scally was 
concerned with the implication of a contractual term to the effect that an employer was under a 
duty to notify the employee of certain contractual benefits. In neither case was the wider context 
of statutory employment protection relevant in shaping the legal reasoning in those decisions. It is 
true that Lord Steyn concluded that:  
 
The principled position is as follows. Provided that a relevant breach of contract can be 
established, and the requirements of causation, remoteness and mitigation can be 
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satisfied, there is no good reason why in the field of employment law recovery of 
financial loss in respect of damage to reputation caused by breach of contract is 
necessarily excluded. I am reinforced in this view by the consideration that such losses 
are in principle recoverable in respect of unfair dismissal: see section 123(1) Employment 
Rights Act 1996; Norton Tool Co. Ltd. v. Tewson [1973] 1 W.L.R. 45, 50–51.118  
 
It is nevertheless revealing that the statutory analogy was directed at the restoration of ‘classic 
contract law principles’ of the kind that had been distorted by Addis,119 and that the statutory 
material merely ‘reinforced’ the position that Lord Steyn had already reached through ordinary 
common law reasoning. 
 In Johnson Lord Hoffmann was explicit in linking the normative transformation of the 
contract of employment as a common law institution to the influence of statutory employment 
protection,120 though he did so in the context of upholding the statute’s pre-emptive effect on 
common law development of the implied term. More interesting, perhaps, was Lord Steyn’s 
judgment in Johnson, given that Lord Steyn rejected the conclusion of the majority on statutory 
pre-emption. Once again, Lord Steyn drew principally upon the common law authorities of Scally 
and Spring to justify the proposition that the underlying judicial philosophy of the employment 
contract had shifted to encompass a concern for the ‘physical, financial and even psychological 
welfare’ of employees.121 In terms of the background statutory context, however, Lord Steyn 
placed great emphasis on the statutory deregulation of employment protection as the impetus for 
common law development.122 In this way, it was the retreat of legislation that prompted common 
law development. Contractual protection— 
 
… is particularly important in the light of the greater pressures on employees due to the 
progressive deregulation of the labour market, the privatization of public services, and the 
globalization of product and financial markets … The need for protection of employees 
through their contractual rights, express and implied by law, is markedly greater than in 
the past.123  
 
This provides a powerful counterpoint to Lord Hoffmann’s judgment. Ultimately, Lord Steyn’s 
theory of the judicial role, when applied to the particular facts in Johnson, runs into the problem 
that statutory pre-emption was constitutionally compelling for the reasons already outlined in 
section III. In other contexts, however, Lord Steyn’s theory may have greater relevance so that 
parliamentary inaction or hostility to workers’ interests should prompt an assertive common law 
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response. A rationale that keeps common law activism within appropriate bounds would be the 
protection of fundamental rights at common law. We return to this possibility in the next section. 
 The second area in which there is an interaction between statute and common law is in 
the legal characterization of personal work relations. It is here that the ‘hybridity’ of employment 
law is at its strongest. Statutory employment rights are allocated to different types of personal 
work contract. Some rights are confined to the narrow category of ‘employees’ working under a 
contract of employment, such as the right not to be unfairly dismissed. Other rights are allocated 
more widely to the category of ‘worker’, as under the national minimum wage and working time 
protections. The tests for identifying ‘employees’ and ‘workers’ are regarded fundamentally as 
common law tests, and the courts have developed complex common law criteria for determining 
the appropriate characterization of personal work relations. One of the principal regulatory 
difficulties faced by the courts is the disjunction between the written contractual documentation 
and the factual reality of the day-to-day working relationship. The written documentation, which 
is increasingly standard form contractual boilerplate, may be designed to manufacture the 
appearance of a legal relationship of self-employment through its construction of contractual 
terms. The factual reality is the parties behave as if the legal relationship was one of employment. 
 In Byrne Bros (Formwork) Ltd v Baird the written contract characterized the individuals 
as self-employed carpenters.124 The individuals issued claims for holiday pay under the working 
time legislation on the basis that they were ‘workers’ and thus entitled to the right to paid annual 
leave. In upholding the claim, Underhill J adopted what could be described as a ‘purposive’ 
approach. In extending the scope of working time protections to ‘workers’, he observed that: 
 
It seems to us that the best guidance is to be found by considering the policy behind the 
inclusion of limb (b) [‘worker’]. That can only have been to extend the benefits of 
protection to workers who are in the same need of that type of protection … Drawing that 
distinction in any particular case will involve all or most of the same considerations as 
arise in drawing the distinction between a contract of service and a contract for services—
but with the boundary pushed further in the putative worker’s favour.125  
 
What is ‘purposive’ about this approach is its identification of the legislative policy underlying the 
introduction of the ‘worker’ category—the extension of statutory protection—which then informs 
the application of the relevant indicative factors under the common law test for ‘worker’. This 
provides a neat example of a legislative policy expressed in a statute being used to shape the 
development of a common law test. 
 The highpoint of this ‘purposive’ approach was reached in the Supreme Court decision in 
Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher.126 In Autoclenz the car valeters signed comprehensive written contracts 
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that contained ‘terms inconsistent’ with employment status. If those written terms were 
contractually valid, the effect would be to negate a legal characterization that the car valeters were 
‘employees’ or ‘workers’. This would disqualify the individuals from bringing statutory claims 
under the working time and minimum wage legislation. The written contracts had been signed, 
which as a matter of ordinary contract law is generally dispositive: a signatory to a written 
contract is bound to its terms.127 Taking its inspiration from landlord and tenant law and the 
problem of ‘sham’ arrangements, contexts that led to ‘the courts concluding that relevant 
contractual provisions were not effective to avoid a particular statutory result’,128 the Supreme 
Court determined that the written documentation was not the same as the ‘true agreement’.129 In 
an important statement of principle, Lord Clarke SCJ concluded that: 
 
[T]he relevant bargaining power of the parties must be taken into account in deciding 
whether the terms of any written agreement in truth represent what was agreed and the 
true agreement will often have to be gleaned from all the circumstances of the case, of 
which the written agreement is only a part. This may be described as a purposive 
approach to the problem.130  
 
This enabled tribunals to disregard ‘terms inconsistent’ with employee or worker status in the 
written documentation if those terms did not reflect the reality of the working arrangements. What 
is the significance of Autoclenz in understanding the interaction between statute and common law? 
From a constitutional perspective, Kavanagh has argued that: 
 
Law-making is a collaborative enterprise … In this enterprise, the legislature plays to lead 
role and the courts have a supporting role, assisting the legislature in the implementation 
of its laws whilst being prepared to stand up for certain values and principles in the 
appropriate case.131  
 
Autoclenz represents this collaborative conception of the court’s role, developing the common law 
tests for ‘employee’ and ‘worker’ in support of a general legislative policy of worker protection. It 
is therefore fair to say that ‘although the statutory context was not discussed in any detail in 
Autoclenz, it was arguably highly influential’.132 The extent to which this ‘purposive’ approach 
has been stable and enduring is questionable, with later cases adopting a more traditional 
contractual approach to the legal characterization of personal work relations.133 This instability is 
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being engendered by the ambiguities surrounding the concept of ‘purposive’ in this context. In 
Byrne Bros, ‘purposive’ referred to a relatively clear legislative policy underlying the statutory 
concept of ‘worker’. Yet Autoclenz was also addressing the concept of ‘employee’, and here the 
legislative policy underlying the category of ‘employee’ is far less clear-cut. So we are left with a 
puzzle about ‘purposive’ that was never resolved by Lord Clarke SCJ: whose purpose? The court, 
the contracting parties, or Parliament? And to what end? In the next section, we suggest that the 
common law protection of fundamental rights provides an interpretive framework for the 
Autoclenz ‘purposive’ approach that provides it with the necessary certainty and stability. 
V Common Law Protection of Fundamental Rights 
 
According to Lord Hoffmann:  
 
Employment law requires a balancing of the interests of employers and employees, with 
proper regard not only to the individual dignity and worth of the employees but also to 
the general economic interest. Subject to observance of fundamental human rights, the 
point at which this balance should be struck is a matter for democratic decision.134  
 
This proposition appears to envisage a limit to the ‘primacy of statute’, in recognizing the 
independent role of the common law in protecting fundamental rights. The notion of fundamental 
rights at common law has attracted increasing judicial and scholarly interest, which may reflect 
wider anxieties about the repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the prospect of a ‘Brexit’ from 
the European Convention on Human Rights.135 This gives the enquiry into the common law’s 
capacities to protect fundamental rights an urgent practical significance. The position of 
fundamental rights at common law is controversial amongst employment lawyers, not least 
because of the functionalist’s reservations about the repressive effects of the common law and the 
concerns about judicial impartiality in legal disputes between employers and workers. 
Nevertheless, those concerns may now be matched or even surpassed by the worry that neo-liberal 
governments pose an even greater threat to workers’ rights through oppressive legislation. Given 
the changing constitutional context to worker protection, employment lawyers should now be 
prepared to engage with the common law fundamental rights paradigm. In assessing the prospects 
for a common law jurisprudence of fundamental rights, there are five main issues. 
 First, which rights count as common law fundamental rights? Unlike a written 
constitution or international treaty, where there is an authoritative text that structures legal 
reasoning, the basic question of whether a particular right is protected at common law is often 
politically and legally contested. Historically, employment lawyers were concerned that common 
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law fundamental rights were really ‘employers’ fundamental rights’ such as private property and 
freedom of contract.136 As case law has developed, certain rights such as freedom of expression 
and access to a court have now been recognized as fundamental rights at common law.137 Other 
scholars have gone further in suggesting that ‘fundamental freedoms of speech, conscience, and 
association, together with the right to a fair trial and immunity from arbitrary arrest and detention, 
are integral parts of any legitimate regime’.138 Increasingly, international law has been identified 
as an interpretive anchor for common law fundamental rights, so that the common law is 
developed to ensure compliance with the UK’s international treaty obligations.139 This is also true 
of customary international law.140 While it may be difficult to argue that common law rights and 
Convention guarantees are now co-extensive, 141  the permeability of the common law to the 
influence of international human rights law gives the common law radical potential. This 
permeability also limits the concerns with an unrestrained judicial creativity, by exposing the 
common law to the expertise of international bodies concerned with fundamental human rights 
norms. 
 Secondly, what of the content of those fundamental rights? Fundamental rights are 
usually framed at a high degree of abstraction. Determining the application of those abstract rights 
in particular cases may invite a high degree of judicial law-making power, and a ‘transfer of law-
making power from legislature to the courts’.142 The effect of this might be to turn what is really a 
political question into a legal question, to be determined by an unelected and democratically 
unaccountable judiciary.143 It is possible to get beyond this rather stark zero-sum conception of the 
constitutional relationship between the court and the legislator. For example, Allan has suggested 
of fundamental common law rights ‘that their precise specification depends on positive law and 
thereby conceding space for legislative initiative’.144 This suggests an important way in which 
legislation might interact with the common law, with statute operating as a kind of determinatio to 
fill out the specific content of the common law fundamental rights, where there are reasonable and 
incommensurable alternatives for specification. 145  This also provides a way of reconciling 
common law fundamental rights with the democratic virtues of legislation in a parliamentary 
democracy. 
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 Thirdly, Craig has identified ‘autochthony’ as an important dimension in developing the 
analytical framework for fundamental rights.146 This refers to ‘the descriptive and normative ideal 
of attachment to indigenous or native values’.147 Within the context of common law fundamental 
rights, this concerns the extent to which domestic courts can develop common law fundamental 
rights so as to depart from the formulation of human rights at the international level. As Craig 
suggests, there is an attraction in the view that the ECHR provides a floor of protection, thereby 
permitting domestic courts to develop higher levels of protection through the common law.148 This 
allows for domestic judicial creativity, whilst avoiding the unappealing scenario of the common 
law protection deviating from a civilized international consensus on the basic threshold of rights 
protection. Moreover, the development of fundamental rights in international law is often 
characterized by a high level of abstraction and generality. ‘Subsidiarity’ is now a watchword of 
international human rights law, envisaging a vital role for national institutions in defining, 
developing and implementing human rights protections in ways that are sensitive to local 
conditions. Nevertheless, the guidance of international human rights law in the judicial 
development of common law norms provides legitimacy to the court’s interpretive role.149  
 Fourthly, Sales has drawn attention to the muted role of common law fundamental rights 
in private law, as compared with public law.150 At least part of the explanation lies in the fact that 
‘The distribution of entitlements in that field reflects a precise balancing of interests worked out 
through time … in the course of which underlying values have been gradually absorbed into 
positive legal rules’. Fundamental rights have tended to be more concerned with the vertical 
relationship between State and citizen, rather than the horizontal relationship between private 
citizens.151 Employment law disrupts this distinction between the vertical and the horizontal. The 
employment relationship creates a situation where it is possible for ‘abuse of power’ to occur, and 
this engages the common law constitution’s concern to restrain abuse of power in the employment 
relation.152 This provides a justification for treating the domain of employment law as especially 
amenable to the development of common law fundamental rights jurisprudence, given its 
normative affinities with public law. 
 Finally, in what ways might the underlying distribution of entitlements by common law 
and statute be reshaped by fundamental rights jurisprudence? It is easier to imagine the ways in 
which common law fundamental rights jurisprudence might inform the development of public 
law, such as a reshaping of the ultra vires doctrine or the development of a proportionality 
standard for judicial review.153 The integration of fundamental rights into the doctrinal apparatus 
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of private law is less straightforward. I will address two areas where the judicial development of 
the interrelationship between common law and statute might be enriched by an engagement with 
fundamental rights jurisprudence. The first area concerns the development of a common law 
individual right to strike, and the balance between common law and legislative development in 
shaping an individual right to strike. The second area concerns some recent variations on the 
Autoclenz problem, and judicial attempts to align the development of common law tests for 
personal work relations with the protective scope of legislation. 
The Right to Strike and the Common Law 
The boldness of the English courts in expanding tort liability for strike organizers has only been 
surpassed by the timidity of English courts in refusing to develop a doctrine of contractual 
suspension for individual strikers. It is now regarded as settled law that a complete withdrawal of 
labour will usually constitute a repudiatory breach of the employment contract. This has been the 
case since the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) decision in Simmons v Hoover Ltd,154 where 
Philips J rejected the argument that the contract of employment should be regarded as suspended 
during strike action. The argument that the contract of employment was suspended rather than 
breached was based upon the earlier Court of Appeal authority of Morgan v Fry, where Lord 
Denning developed the notion of a common law right to strike. 155  It was implicit in Lord 
Denning’s reasoning that the doctrine of contractual suspension was the logical corollary of a right 
to strike.156 The suspension analysis also attracted the support of Davies LJ in Morgan, though it 
quickly disappeared from view in the English common law. Paradoxically, perhaps, the approach 
in Morgan attracted forceful criticism from labour lawyers sympathetic to the protection of a wide 
liberty of strike action for trade unions and workers. For example, Lord Wedderburn described 
Lord Denning’s intervention as a ‘well intentioned innovation’ but one that was beset by a host of 
definitional difficulties.157 He concluded that ‘none of the modern cases doubt that the answer in 
Simmons was correct … The common law, built on the very pillars of property and contract, 
cannot accommodate a right to strike’.158 The reluctance of the employment lawyers to embrace 
Morgan was no doubt driven by deep functionalist hostility to the common law and the limits of 
common law adjudication in the politically sensitive area of strike disputes. 
 Shortly after Morgan had been handed down, the Donovan Commission set itself against 
a doctrine of contractual suspension.159 The complex and controversial matters of policy that 
would require resolution in the implementation of a doctrine of suspension were not amenable to 
judicial resolution, and it was unlikely that even Parliament was up to the task of fixing upon a 
workable definition of such matters. The Donovan recommendations reflected a determined 
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preference to re-establish a philosophy of judicial abstention in industrial disputes. The judgment 
in Simmons was sympathetic to this philosophy. In rejecting the suspension theory, Philips J was 
certainly apprised of the Donovan recommendations. While formally basing his decision not to 
adopt Lord Denning’s analysis on the highly unusual historical context to Morgan, decided in the 
afterglow of Rookes, Philips J developed a line of reasoning that relied heavily on the primacy of 
legislation and the need for judicial abstention. He noted that, in the legislation of the social 
contract period, the availability of some statutory rights was ‘severely curtailed’ during strike 
action.160 Furthermore, the complexities of suspension meant that legislation would be required to 
implement it, rather than the more incremental technique of common law adjudication.161 The 
whole area ‘is essentially one of industrial policy, and beyond our competence to determine’.162 
 The determination of a ‘right to strike’ is a matter of deep normative controversy. In this 
respect, the judicial self-restraint in Simmons reflected legitimate concerns about the role of the 
judiciary in making those controversial policy choices, and a constitutional preference for the 
democratic process of legislative enactment. It is possible for courts to be sensitive to those 
institutional concerns, however, whilst developing a common law right to strike. First, the right to 
strike is supported by international treaty obligations and customary international law.163 The 
norms of international human rights law provide a source of principles to identify areas of 
consensus on the core elements of a right to strike that might inform the development of common 
law principles. 164  Secondly, concerns about ‘autochthony’ are mitigated by the patterns of 
diversity in national practices on the right to strike. This leaves significant latitude to national 
institutions in developing a right to strike within wide parameters of national cultural difference. 
Despite this legitimate variability, there are ‘behind the kaleidoscope of institutions … common 
standards or ambitions’.165 According to Wedderburn, the ‘central peculiarity is the dominant 
precept that workers who take strike action or other industrial action normally act in breach of 
their employment contracts’.166 The doctrine of contractual suspension therefore lies at the hard 
minimal core of what might be expected of a right to strike at common law.  
 Finally, this might be a context where the common law evinces respect for the abstract 
right to strike as a fundamental right, whereas legislation specifies the detail of its implementation. 
One of the historical concerns with a doctrine of contractual suspension was the judicial 
specification of its limits: did it apply to ‘unofficial’ industrial action? Did it apply where 
industrial action was in breach of a procedure agreement? To all forms of industrial action or just 
complete cessations of labour? These were sensitive matters of policy not apt for resolution by an 
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unelected judiciary. We now have a statutory concept of ‘protected’ industrial action under the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, s 238A, to the effect that it is 
automatically unfair to dismiss an employee if the reason for dismissal is that the employee 
participated in ‘protected’ industrial action. The industrial action is ‘protected’ if ‘he commits an 
act which, or a series of acts each of which, he is induced to commit by an act which by virtue of 
section 219 is not actionable in tort’. This establishes a link between the scope of unfair dismissal 
protection and the lawfulness of industrial action at the collective level (the action must be 
authorized or endorsed by the union; it must be a trade dispute; the relevant procedural constraints 
must be satisfied; and so forth). It is a small step to link the scope of contractual suspension to the 
statutory parameters of ‘protected’ industrial action under section 238A. This ensures that the 
courts protect the abstract right to strike at common law, whereas Parliament determines the 
controversial policy matters that frame the detailed scope of contractual suspension. This reflects 
the kind of collaborative engagement between courts and the legislature on display in Autoclenz, 
and the scope for fertile interaction between common law and legislation in the specification of 
fundamental rights. 
The Personal Scope of Fundamental Rights 
In Bates van Winkelhof v Clyde & Co LLP the Supreme Court was concerned with whether a 
partner in a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) fell within the scope of the ‘worker’ category, 
which would permit her to proceed with a statutory claim for whistleblowing protection.167 The 
Supreme Court concluded that she was a ‘worker’. Lady Hale SCJ emphasized the need to apply 
the unvarnished statutory wording in ERA 1996, s 230(3)(b),168 namely work undertaken under: 
 
… any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in 
writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or 
services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that 
of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the 
individual.  
 
Given the solicitor’s integration into the business, and given that Clyde & Co did not relate to her 
as a client or customer, she was a worker and hence within the scope of the statutory 
whistleblowing protection. Lady Hale SCJ then considered the extent of the claimant’s protection 
under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, given the special importance of 
whistleblowing protection under the Convention’s freedom of expression provision. Since she was 
a worker on a straightforward application of the statutory test in section 230, she did not proceed 
to consider the effect of the interpretative obligation under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 
1998. 
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 The outcome in Bates van Winkelhof is undoubtedly correct, and the route to the outcome 
has the attraction of simplicity. Nevertheless, it represents a missed opportunity to clarify the role 
that common law fundamental rights might play in developing the categories of personal work. 
The idea that there is a simple unvarnished meaning of a statutory provision, with linguistic 
interpretation detached from constitutional context, is unhelpful. Indeed, the very idea of an 
‘ambiguity’ in a statutory formula is itself a controversial interpretive matter.169 The meaning of 
statutes must be determined through a complex interpretive exercise, constructing the textual 
meaning and legislative purposes in the light of background constitutional concepts.  
 The statutory protection of whistleblowing, accorded to ‘workers’, engages two 
fundamental rights at common law. Most obviously, it is concerned with the protection of freedom 
of expression in the workplace. The prior jurisdictional matter of identifying a ‘worker’ is also 
concerned with the fundamental right of access to a court. It should be remembered that disputes 
about personal work status are usually disputes about the jurisdiction of the tribunal to consider 
the merits of the substantive statutory claim. If the court concludes that the claimant is not an 
employee or a worker, the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider the legal merits of the 
claim. For these reasons, the common law tests for employment status should be strongly 
purposive in character where fundamental rights are at stake.170 Any interpretive doubts about 
status should be resolved in the putative worker’s favour. This is not the same as rewriting the 
parties’ bargain. The common law test must also be formulated in accordance with the 
constitutional value of legality, and this requires that the legal characterization should be 
congruent with the reasonable expectations of the parties. Ideally, neither party should be caught 
unawares by the court’s judgment.  
 In Bates van Winkelhof, Lady Hale SCJ noted that the court had to work very hard to 
conclude that a member of an LLP was not a worker.171 That will often be so in cases of disputed 
status where the actual work practices are conducted on the footing of an employment 
relationship, whatever the technical legal characterization. In this way, the justified scepticism 
about contract in determining employment status should not be confused with scepticism about 
the common law.172 Employment lawyers are rightly concerned with the exclusionary effects of 
contractual doctrines such as ‘mutuality of obligation’ or ‘substitution clauses’ on workers’ access 
to justice. Nevertheless, we cannot live without the common law, because even predominantly 
statute-based tests of employment status depend for their interpretation upon the common law’s 
background matrix of constitutional values. The jurisprudence of common law fundamental rights 
enables employment lawyers to make a virtue out of that necessity. 
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 Such an approach would have been very welcome in the recent Court of Appeal case of 
Smith v Carillion (JM) Ltd.173 This case constituted an extreme version of the status problem, in 
that there was seemingly no contract at all between the claimant and the defendant. Mr Smith had 
been employed in a triangular agency arrangement in the construction industry. It was conceded 
that the end user had provided information about Mr Smith’s trade union activities to a 
blacklisting organization, the Consulting Association, and that this constituted a detriment that had 
the purpose of penalizing him for taking part in the activities of an independent trade union. The 
claims related to historic discrimination, and at the relevant time, the statutory protection was 
confined to ‘employees’. Statutory protection was extended to the wider category of ‘worker’ in 
2004. The Court of Appeal rejected Mr Smith’s appeal. There was no contract between the end 
user and Mr Smith, and the facts did not meet the strict common law threshold of necessity in 
order to imply such a contract at the relevant time.174 Nor could the interpretative obligation under 
the Human Rights Act 1998 be brought into play, to the effect that the statutory provision 
protecting him from detriment should be construed widely in light of Mr Smith’s Article 11 and 
Article 8 rights, because the conduct of the end user predated the enactment of that legislation.  
 This decision constitutes a signal failure to protect the claimant’s fundamental rights at 
common law. The common law protected fundamental rights prior to 1998, particularly in 
situations such as this where there was such an egregious violation at the core of freedom of 
association. Indeed, in both Bates van Winkelhof and Carillion there is a tendency to treat 
fundamental rights as belonging to a separate compartment of legal reasoning governed by the 
Human Rights Act 1998, rather than as a seamless element integrated into general common law 
reasoning. In applying the common law necessity test for the implication of a contract, it is 
imperative to ask: necessary to what end? The blacklisting of trade unionists is a serious violation 
at the very core of freedom of association. Its consequences were catastrophic in destroying Mr 
Smith’s ability to secure employment in his chosen occupation. The implication of a contract of 
employment between Mr Smith and the end user was necessary to enable Mr Smith to seek 
protection of his fundamental right to freedom of association. It was also necessary to enable him 
to gain access to a court to seek an independent adjudication of the legal merits of his claim. The 
court’s refusal to imply the contract of employment between the claimant and the end user left 
him without the possibility of any legal redress. It was an abdication of the court’s constitutional 
responsibility. This constitutional responsibility required it to loosen the common law test of 
contractual implication. For example, the test of implication might have required that the facts 
were capable of sustaining the implication of a contract of employment. Access to a court is 
particularly important where the allegation is that other fundamental rights have been violated. 
This was true in both Bates van Winkelhof and Carillion. 
 As with the common law right to strike, it is possible to keep the common law 
fundamental rights paradigm within appropriate institutional bounds in respect of employment 
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status. Litigation concerning employment status usually concerns the claimant’s access to a court 
to seek a judgment on the merits of a substantive legal claim protected by statute. Employment 
status thus engages the fundamental right of access to a court, a right that is securely established at 
common law. Where the claimant is seeking to vindicate another fundamental right in court, such 
as freedom of expression (as in Bates van Winkelhof) or freedom of association (as in Carillion), 
the normative urgency of the common law right of access to a court is heightened.175 This does not 
supplant the democratic role of Parliament. Employment status may be given a more specific 
statutory elaboration, as with the ‘worker’ concept. Furthermore, the substantive fundamental 
rights being asserted in Bates van Winkelhof and Carillion are statutory rights, whose parameters 
have been defined by Parliament, and whose contours can be informed by relevant international 
norms on whistleblowing and blacklisting protections. The common law is therefore subsidiary to 
legislation in its development of a strong purposive approach to fundamental rights protection. 
This can provide the Autoclenz approach with the stability that it needs to become an enduring 
feature of common law reasoning. 
VI Conclusion 
Cases should be judged on their display of principle and reason, not on who happens to win on the 
day. A victory for the ‘high-status’ employee in Johnson can just as easily switch into the 
discovery of a new economic tort applied to striking workers employed on ‘zero hours’ contracts 
at a sports retailer. Judging legal reasoning by outcomes is a risky business. There may be little 
consensus on what a just outcome looks like, particularly in a discipline as ‘political’ as 
employment law where protagonists often line up to take sides on the basis of their passions and 
instinctive class loyalties. If we detach legal reasoning from constitutional constraints when it 
suits us, we are lost. The social and economic effects of a maverick appellate judiciary may be 
quite indiscriminate in impact. For every Mr Johnson who enjoys his legal windfall, there will be 
a Mr Barnard who does not receive his legal due. 
 None of this should be taken to imply that the identification of those constitutional 
constraints is an uncontroversial exercise. On the contrary, the interrelationship between 
Parliament and the courts provokes deep and ongoing interpretive disagreements. The debates 
reflect normative disagreements about core constitutional concepts such as legality, democracy 
and legislative supremacy. They also reflect empirical concerns about the real-world functioning 
of democratic institutions, and the extent to which the opportunities for democratic influence have 
been eroded by the shameful growth of social and economic inequality in our political community. 
Eulogies to the democratic role of Parliament are rather hollow if growing numbers of citizens live 
in conditions of such economic and social precariousness that their political efficacy is illusory. If 
anything of value comes out of the ‘Brexit’ referendum result, it might be that our political and 
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legal elites will finally realize that political consent to unjust political and economic arrangements 
may not always be forthcoming.  
 These constitutional debates are particularly intense in respect of common law 
fundamental rights. In a recent contribution, Sales LJ has observed that: 
 
Primary law-making authority is vested in Parliament, and it is Parliament’s intention 
which should be the focus of the inquiry. I suggest that the courts should only identify a 
fundamental right or interest for the purposes of legality if it is plausible to infer that 
Parliament as a collective body itself recognises such a right or interest …176  
 
In a similar vein, he goes on to observe that ‘if the Human Rights Act were repealed, the courts 
might feel distinctly uncomfortable in drawing in any very concrete way on the Convention rights 
or the case law of the ECtHR as evidence for domestic fundamental rights’.177  
 Such an approach is highly controversial in the light of growing concerns about the 
impact of economic inequality on equal democratic citizenship and the corresponding distortion of 
opportunities for democratic influence. As such, the attraction of Sales LJ’s position depends upon 
a set of assumptions about the functioning of democratic institutions that are unlikely to be 
satisfied at the current time. It is one thing to accord legislation a primary role in specifying the 
determinate content of abstract fundamental rights, with common law operating in a subsidiary 
mode. That seems constitutionally reasonable. To render the very existence of a fundamental right 
dependent upon legislative practices arguably represents an abdication of the judicial role.178 
Labour lawyers will be familiar with the Trade Union Act 2016, a draconian and coercive piece of 
legislation that simultaneously attempts to choke off the political voice of trade unions whilst 
circumscribing the right to strike. Should the courts treat this as further evidence for a narrowing 
horizon for freedom of association, excluding the protection of the political and industrial 
activities of trade unions contrary to fundamental norms in international law? In these respects, the 
Trade Union Act 2016 fits with settled legislative dispositions extending back over decades. At 
times like this, and pace Sales LJ, the courts should regard themselves as in a ‘conflictual 
partnership’ with Parliament,179 ready to act as a constitutional counterweight where fundamental 
rights are systematically eroded by governmental practices. The arguments in favour of judicial 
activism would be particularly strong when there is an established consensus in state practice and 
international law identifying the normative core of a fundamental right. Freedom of association, 
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including the right to strike, will not cease to be a fundamental right of citizens even if Parliament 
declares its negation. 
 One thing is for sure. Johnson provides no support for Sales LJ’s suggested approach. 
Deference and pre-emption is sometimes warranted, as in Johnson itself. It is more difficult to 
justify where the very existence of a fundamental right is at issue. Judicial deference should never 
become an alibi for judicial cowardice, particularly where vulnerable citizens would otherwise 
lack an effective democratic voice. This leaves the progressive labour lawyer in the rather 
discomforting position, not only of supporting Lord Hoffmann in Johnson, but of positioning the 
common law centre stage in the institutional protection of citizens’ fundamental rights at work. 
